Cyber-coordinating Mechanism and Strategic Management Accounting

Based on the analysis of the need of a new coordinating mechanism in cyber-value chain, this paper puts forward a cyber-coordinating mechanism, which is a mechanism between market mechanism and firm hierarchical mechanism. It is the theoretical basic point for setting up the system of Strategic Management Accounting in cyber-value chain. This paper conducts the model of Strategic Management Accounting based on cyber-coordinating mechanism, and presents evidence from a case study that was conducted to understand the impact of disintegration on original suppliers and of reintegration on new suppliers in order to support our cyber-coordinating mechanism hypothesis and the application value of the new model of strategic management accounting in cyber-value chain.     

On Testing for the Nullity of Some Skewness Coefficients

Three tests for the skewness of an unknown distribution are derived for iid data. They are based on suitable normalization of estimators of some usual skewness coefficients. Their asymptotic null distributions are derived. The tests are next shown to be consistent and their power under some sequences of local alternatives is investigated. Their finite sample properties are also studied through a simulation experiment, and compared to those of the √ b ₂-test.     

A theory of global strategic alliances: The case of the global auto industry

The theory articulated in this paper suggests that the desire to reduce demand and competitive uncertainty are two separate, important motives for alliance formation. Taking this as a starting point, we predict the configuration of horizontal alliances that we might expect to observe within an industry when firms experience these uncertainties to different degrees. An empirical test of this theory using data from the global auto industry yields results consistent with the view (1) that alliances are a device for reducing both the uncertainties that arise from unpredictable demand conditions and those that arise from competitive interdependence, and (2) that variation of demand uncertainty and competitive uncertainty across firms explains differentials in both the intensity and structure of their horizontal alliance activity.     

Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.     

日本循环经济的运作方式及启示

日本是世界上最早探索循环经济发展模式的国家之一,也是循环经济立法最全、资源循环利用率最高的国家。日本发展循环经济是客观资源条件、经济快速增长和实现可持续发展的要求,多年来,在循环经济的实践中取得了很大的成绩,积累了丰富的经验。目前我国已充分认识到发展循环经济的重要性,日本在建立循环型社会方面的运作方式给我们提供了经验和启示。     

"交保证金"的报酬政策在中国存在的原因解析--一种扩展的夏皮罗-斯蒂格利茨模型

本文通过建立一种扩展的夏皮罗—斯蒂格利茨模型，解释了“交保证金”的报酬政策在中国存在的原因。当劳动力处于买方市场时，工人在失业和就业两者之间严格偏好于就业，厂商有可能采取“交保证金”的报酬政策，那么，厂商就可以支付较低的实际工资，获得较好的监督效果，使工人努力工作。厂商以较低的工资雇佣工人，可以使劳动力市场的就业人数有所增加，但由于并不是所有工人都能够通过“交保证金”而实现就业，故这一报酬政策不能使市场出清。     

A dynamic approach to the analysis of strategic alliances

The increasing trend in strategic alliance formation between major firms around the world, has prompted researchers from various disciplines to look at this phenomenon in great detail. In this paper, we review alternate approaches in the literature in this area. We then propose a non-linear dynamic approach to study the formation of competitive strategic alliances and contrast it with the traditional game-theoretic approach. The pros and cons of these two approaches are discussed with reference to a competitive alliance scenario. Dynamic models have significant managerial implications as they enable us to investigate ‘if-then’ type scenarios and project the impact of different strategies.     

A strategic human resource perspective of firm competitive behavior

Embedded within firms are unique stores of intangible human assets that likely influence the way firms compete. We argue that the human and social capital of a firm, particularly at the upper echelon and board of director (BOD) levels, contribute to the firm's awareness of the competitive environment and its motivation and ability to undertake numerous, complex, and forceful competitive actions. We also suggest that the firm's executive compensation systems moderate the effects of these intangible human assets on firm competitive behavior. By examining how human capital, intra-firm social capital, and executive compensation influence firm competitive behavior, we advance a strategic HRM perspective of firm competitive behavior and outline several implications for future research.     

Infrastructure provision and international market share rivalry

The paper examines a model of strategic infrastructure investment. Two oligopolistic firms compete on home and foreign product markets for market shares. The national governments support the firms in the market rivalry by providing cost reducing public infrastructure services that are financed out of taxing an input used in the production process. It is shown, that infrastructure policy can be used as an instrument for strategic trade policy. However, governments are facing the problem of balancing the burden of taxation and the benefits of infrastructures. The theoretical model also raises some critical issues with respect to the policy relevance of recent empirical infrastructure research.     

战略无形资产、商誉与企业持续竞争优势

本文运用“资源基础论”分析了战略无形资产与企业持续竞争优势和超额利润之间的关系,论述了现行财务会计模式对战略无形资产信息的综合反映形式。认为商誉是现行财务会计模式对企业持续竞争优势的综合反映形式,其本质是在现行财务会计模式下无法单独入账的企业战略无形资产,商誉的性质实际上是战略无形资产性质的外在综合表现,外购商誉的本质是被收购企业未入账的战略无形资产,外购商誉的会计处理应该依据并购后被收购企业战略无形资产价值的增减变动情况来决定。